

## Chapter 3

### **Urdu Party: Past and Present**

During the nineteenth century, even when the British had become supreme in India, Muslims who could not reconcile remained active against the British. Therefore for the British they mattered most as other India lay dormant. Who were these Muslims we talk about? We are talking about the leading Muslim classes all over India. Those who reconciled or opposed the British, collectively, the future All-India Muslim League arose from them. The leading and the core elements of the generally leading Muslims of India were, in general, the Urdu-speaking elements of United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) to whom I have given the name 'Urdu Party'.

Below, I have very briefly described their activities. They were destined to become later under the leadership of Jinnah the leaders of Pakistan movement. Muslim masses of Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan had no consciousness at that time of their own societies, communities and therefore of their languages. It was like their pre-manhood time. This their pre-manhood stage by default gave to the Urdu party and therefore to Jinnah a sort of 'veto' power. It was entirely in their hands to do whatever with them. And in such situations, the worst is likely to happen. And the worst happened. Sindhis got their 'share' of the evil in getting their lands occupied and their language which with good luck had achieved an envious position under the British becoming 'enslaved'.

I have tried to throw light on their activism in the name of Muslims of India. Their distorted state of mind and the ideology they manufactured with this mind have kept peoples of Pakistan enslaved, their future stolen from them and putting Pakistan itself on a course where there is no 'end of the tunnel'. As things stand today, history has pushed me to this stage that I have to try very hard to rescue the peoples of Pakistan from them and put Pakistan on a path of civilisation, power and glory. How could I have thought that such a heavy responsibility would fall on my shoulders! Such are unknowable ways of history!

## Urdu Party's Past and Present

### British empire in India 'Muhammadan' power

W. W. Hunter wrote:

The Bengal\* Muhammadans are again in a strange state. For years a Rebel Colony has threatened our Frontier; from time to time sending forth fanatic swarms, who have attacked our camps, burned our villages, murdered our subjects, and involved our troops in three costly wars. Month by month, this hostile settlement across the border has been systematically recruited from heart of Bengal. Successive State Trials prove that a network of conspiracy has spread itself over our provinces, and that the bleak mountains which rise beyond the Punjab are united by a chain of treason depots with the tropical swamps through which the Ganges merges into the sea. They disclose an organization which systematically levies money and men in the Delta, and forwards them by regular stages along our high-roads to the Rebel Camp two miles off. Men of keen intelligence and ample fortune have embarked in the plot, and a skilful system of remittances has reduced one of the most perilous enterprises of treason to a safe operation of banking. (p. 9) Sayyid Ahmad (Brelvi) had appeared in 1824 among the 'wild mountaineers of the Peshawar Frontier, preaching a Holy War against the rich Sikh towns of the Panjab. ... He travelled through Kandahar and Cabul, raising the country as he went, and consolidating his influence by a skilful coalition of the tribes. (p. 13) And ... 'On the 21<sup>st</sup> December 1826, the Jihad against the Infidel Sikhs' had begun. (p. 14) Eventually, 'he was surprised by Sikh Army under Prince Sher Singh, and slain' (at Balakot in May 1831). (p. 17)

While the more fanatical of the Muslims have thus engaged in overt sedition, the whole Muhammadan community has been openly deliberating on their obligation to rebel. During the past nine months, the leading newspapers in Bengal have filled their columns with discussion as to the day of the Muhammadans to wage war against the Queen. The Rebel Camp on the Punjab Frontier owes its origin to Sayyid Ahmad, a native of British District of Rai Bareilly. He was born in the month of Muharram of 1201 A.H., or 1786 A.D. (pp. 9-11, 39)

Between 1850 and 1857 the Frontier disorders forced us to send out sixteen distinct expeditions, aggregating, 33,000 Regular Troops; and between 1850 and 1863 the number rose to twenty separate expeditions, aggregating 60,000 Regular Troops, besides Irregular Auxiliaries and Police. During this time the Sittana Colony, although stirring up a perpetual spirit of fanaticism along the Frontier, had wisely avoided direct collision with our troops. They might secretly help the tribes whom

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they had incited against us, but they did not dare to wage war on their own account. (P. 22)

\*Bihar and Orissa: separated from Bengal in 1912. Renamed Bihar in 1936 when Orissa became a separate province. W. W. Hunter's book from which this quote is taken appeared in 1871. Therefore the 'Bengal' of the author means Bengal, Bihar and Orissa combined. - MAM

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From the 1857 'Mutiny Report' of Captain H.R. James, Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar, to Lieutenant Colonel H.B. Edwardes, Commissioner, Peshawar Division, 1<sup>st</sup> March 1858:

Mokurrub Khan, the chief of Punjtar, ... had just called into Punjtar as auxiliaries a detachment of Hindoostanee fanatics from the colony of "Ghazees" (or martyrs) who have for years settled at Sitana on the Indus, supported by secret supplies of money from disaffected Indian princes. ... The most rancorous and seditious letters had been intercepted from Mahomedan bigots, in Patna and Thaneysur, to ... soldiers of the 64<sup>th</sup> Native Infantry, ... These letters alluded to a long series of correspondence that had been going on, through these men of the 64<sup>th</sup> Infantry, with the Hindoostanee fanatics in Swat and Sitana.

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P. Hardy wrote:

Lord Mayo (1869-72) had recognized before his assassination (8 February 1872) that Muslims formed a distinctively dangerous class of Her majesty's subjects in India, which it would be politic to conciliate. ... He did not visualise them as an active political association or community upon an all-India scale. Muslims were to be the passive recipients of limited British favours ... Within fifteen years of the Mutiny and Rising, no British statesman accepted the Muslims or indeed any other grouping of their Indian subjects as politically activist, still less as politically self-determining. By the eighteen-nineties, however, British statesmen and officials were prepared to see in the Muslims a great and separate political community. (p. 116)

In May 1877, within a month of the Russian declaration of war on Turkey, Lytton (1876—80) wrote to Lord Salisbury, then Secretary of State for India:

'So far as I can judge the feeling of our Mahomedan subjects at the present moment is eminently satisfactory, more loyal than it has been at any former period perhaps. But all the government officers whose special business it is to study and watch

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Mahomedan feeling in India are strongly of the opinion that, were we suspected by our Mahomedan subjects of active connivance with Russia in the spoliation of Turkey, and yet more, did they see us openly sharing the plunder, we should probably be at once confronted by an internal embarrassment sufficiently serious to paralyse all external action on our part; we should not only have to reckon on a *real* jihad all around our frontier, but in every Anglo-Indian home there would be a traitor, a foe and possibly an assassin. Such a danger might possibly be more difficult to deal with than the mutiny which cost us such an effort to suppress. . . . It is my strong impression that, at the present moment, the lives of all your officers and European subjects in India mainly depend on the course of your Eastern policy and its freedom from all appearance of subserviency to Russia. . . . There is no getting over the fact that the British empire is a Mahomedan power, and that it entirely depends upon the policy of Her Majesty's Government, whether the sentiment of our Mahomedan subjects is to be an immense security or an immense danger, to us.' (pp. 118-119)

In the eighteen-seventies and eighteen-eighties, when, through involvement in the defence of the Ottoman empire against Russia, the acquisition of Cyprus and intervention in Egypt, Britain was becoming a colonial power in the centre of the Muslim world, British statesmen began to depict the British empire in India as a 'Muhammadan' power and to consider the Muslims of India as one of the balls to be kept in the air in the jugglery of world-policy. . . . The 'Indian Muhammadan' bugaboo in British foreign policy had been born. (pp. 118. 119)

1. From about 1880 European pressure upon the Muslim world steadily grew. Tunis was occupied by the French in 1881, Egypt by the British in 1882, Eritrea by the Italians by 1885 and the Sudan by the British in 1898. It appeared, correctly, that Britain had lost interest in defending the Ottoman empire against Russia at the Bosphorus, now that she was directly safeguarding the Suez Canal route to India by the physical occupation of Egypt (with the Franco-Russian alliance of 1891-2 she had also lost the naval ability to intervene in the Bosphorus). Indian Muslims were dismayed by Britain's aloofness towards the brief Graeco-Turkish war of 1897 and the outcry in England against the Turks during the Armenian massacres of 1894 and 1896. (pp. 176-177)

2. Support and sympathy for the Ottoman sultan, whose own emissaries had not been inactive in India, began to worry the British government in India by about the middle of the nineties. They were also disturbed lest the Amir of Afghanistan show his teeth when British forces were committed against the Pathan tribes on the north-west. (p. 177)

3. Sir Anthony MacDonnell, the Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces, wrote (August 1897) to the viceroy: there can be no doubt that there is great sympathy with Turkey and that the prevalent feeling partakes of the nature of an Islamic revival. This I believe to be partly due to incitement from outside India and partly spontaneous, and I think it has been growing for some time and is fostered

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in Mahomedan schools. The commissioner of Agra tells me that many more people than formerly have taken to wearing Turkish *fez* and this is perhaps a straw indicating how the wind is beginning to blow. (p. 177)

4. The strength of feeling in India in favour of the Ottoman sultan's claims to be the *Khalifa* of all Muslims and in favour of *Jihad* against the British may be gauged by the reactions of loyalist Muslims. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's pamphlet *Islam aur Jihad*, published in 1900 and calling for loyalty towards the British rule, suggests that many *ulama* were actively disaffected towards British rule. In the last years of his life Sir Saiyid Ahmad Khan was so worried by the wave of antipathy towards the British and of support for the Turkish sultan that he wrote a number of essays denying the latter's claim to be *khalifa*. (p.178)

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Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada:

In the inaugural session of the Muslim League (Dec. 1906), Nawab Salim-ul-lah Bahadur of Dacca said:

In 1893, we were naturally very anxious to impress upon the British Government that we were loyal subjects and law-abiding citizens, for it was considered that our rulers had some doubts on the subject, which, however unnecessary, were perhaps not wholly unnatural at the time. (P. 8)

To-day the aspect of affairs has greatly changed. The Government has been convinced of our steadfast loyalty under the most trying situations. In 1897, Lord Elgin bore testimony to the unflinching fidelity of the Mohamedan troops that opposed their own co-religionists on the battle-fields of Chitral and the borderlands, and shed their own blood and the blood of their brothers for their king and country. (P. 8)

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Pundit Nehru wrote in his 'Discovery of India':

The United Provinces (including Delhi) are a curious amalgam, and in some ways an epitome of India. They are the seat of the old Hindu culture as well as of the Persian culture that came in Afghan and Mughal times, and hence the mixture of the two is most in evidence there, intermingled with the culture of the west. There is less of provincialism there than in any other parts of India. For long they have

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considered themselves, and have been looked upon by others, as the heart of India. Indeed in popular parlance, they are often referred to as Hindustan. (p. 334)

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The Mughal emperors in India recognized no Khalifa or spiritual superiors outside India. It was only after the complete collapse of the Mughal power early in the nineteenth century that the name of the Turkish Sultan began to be mentioned in Indian mosques. This practice was confirmed after the Mutiny. (p. 344)

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### Again P. Hardy:

To the end of his days, Sir Saiyid Ahmad Khan believed it was necessary for Indian Muslims to allow the British to define the terms and conditions of their political life. The memory of 1857, and the technical and organizational prowess of Western states which he observed during his visit to Europe in 1869-70, walled in his political imagination. [13] (p. 179) Hardy

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### Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada:

In the inaugural session of the Muslim League (Dacca, December 30, 1906), Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk in his presidential address said:

I feel it necessary to say that . . . we who have not yet forgotten the tradition of our own recent rule in India and elsewhere, and are more intimately acquainted than other communities of India with the proper relations which should subsist between the Government and its subjects, should accept it as a rule of our conduct that the plant of the political rights of a subject race thrives best in the soil of loyalty, and consequently the Musalmans should prove themselves loyal to their Government before they ask for a recognition of any of their rights. The Musalmans are only a fifth in number as compared with the total population of the country, and it is manifest that if at any remote period the British Government ceases to exist in India, then the rule of India would pass into the hands of that community which is nearly four times as large as ourselves. Now, gentlemen, let each of you consider what will be your condition if such a situation is created in India. Then, our life, our property, our honour, and our faith will all be in great

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danger. . . . And to prevent the realization of such aspirations on the part of our neighbours, the Muslims cannot find better and surer means than to congregate under the banner of Great Britain, and to devote their lives and property in its protection. . . . I shall be the last person, gentlemen, to suspect our neighbours of evil intentions, but I do not hesitate in declaring that unless the leaders of the Congress make sincere efforts as speedily as possible, to quell the hostility against the Government and the British rule, which is fast increasing in a large body of their followers, the necessary consequence of all that is being openly done and said today will be that sedition would be rampant, and the Muslims of India would be called upon to perform the necessary duty of combating this rebellious spirit, side by side with the British Government, more effectively than by the mere use of words. (P. 4-5)

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## Chaudhri Muhammad Ali:

Largely through the efforts of Jinnah . . . an agreement on a scheme of constitutional reforms was reached between the Congress and the League at their annual sessions held in Lucknow in 1916. The agreement came to be known as the Lucknow Pact. It conceded separate electorates for Muslims . . . Under the Pact, the Muslim representation was fixed at 33-1/3 percent of the Indian elected members for the central government; at 50 and 40 percent respectively for the provinces of the Punjab and Bengal, where the majority of the population was Muslim; and at 33-1/3, 30, 25, 15 and 15 percent respectively for Bombay, United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces, and Madras. The Punjab and Bengal got less representation than their Muslim population warranted, whereas the other provinces, in which the Muslims were in minority, received more. (p. 15)

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## P. Hardy:

It sacrificed the interests of the Muslim majority provinces to those of the minority provinces, and those of the U.P. in particular. It was not, however, popular with the conservative U.P. Muslim who would have preferred a 50 percent proportion of legislative council seats in the U.P. with permanent British rule, without thought of a united Congress-League stand against the British at the all-India level. . . . In any event, with the Punjab in the grip of the Lieutenant-Governor O'Dwyer and the recruiting sergeant, and the Muslim League leadership in the Bengal (in the hands of Fazl al-Haq who signed the pact) only too gratified to gain [more than] Morley-Minto percentage of Muslim seats [1909] in the provincial legislature,

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there was no challenge to the dominance of the U.P. Muslim politician. (pp. 187-88)

The political ‘lift-off’ of the League occurred in the United Provinces between 1937 and 1939. It was here that the threat of the homespun-clad Hindi-speaking Congress activist to the Muslim and Urdu-speaking bearer of Mughal culture was most felt. It was here that, with a growing proportion of Muslims knowing English and having college qualifications, middle-class competition for government and professional careers was keenest: it was noticeable that the League vote was greater in urban than in rural areas. It was here that Muslim landlords had the wealth and standing to resist tenancy legislation. It was here that Muslims felt most strongly that they were the natural aristocracy of the country and it was here, at Aligarh University, that the League found an eager band of young propagandists and election workers. The United Provinces first gave Jinnah that provincial  *pied a terre*  (foot on the ground) which as an all-India politician he had previously lacked; it also provided the League with its ‘natural’ leaders, able to meet British politicians and administrators on socially equal terms. Even in 1946, when the destiny of the Muslim majority provinces was immediately at stake, the United Provinces had four members of the Working Committee of the League to three each for Bengal and Punjab. (p. 237)

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**Sources:** (1) The Indian Muslims: By W.W. Hunter, First published 1871, 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition 1871, 1999 publication by Niaz Ahmad (Sang-e-Meel Publications, Lahore). (2) The Muslims of British India: By P. Hardy, First Corrected South Asia Edition 1998, Cambridge University Press/ Foundation Books, New Delhi. (3) Foundations of Pakistan: All-India Muslim League Documents: 1906-47, Edited by Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, Vol 1, 1906-1924, 1969. (4) The Discovery of India: By Jawaharlal Nehru, Oxford University Press, Thirteenth Impression 1993. (5) The Emergence of Pakistan: By Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, 2<sup>nd</sup> Impression 1973, Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

## The Present

### Mohajir Mind, Partition and Pakistan

This is about the present of the Urdu Party. And this got started because of the book ‘Partition and the Making of the Mohajir Mindset’ Oxford (2008) by Brigadier A. R. Siddiqi (a Mohajir from Old Delhi) which I read during January 2012. The



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author has used various descriptions to identify those who presently are ‘Mohajirs’: ‘Urdu-speaking Indian Muslims mainly of Delhi and Oudh (capital Lucknow - MAM), Urdu-speaking UP-Dehliwallas, People (obviously Muslims - MAM) of the Ganga-Yamuna belt, Mohajirs, Hinustanis, Mohajirs – the Urdu-speaking refugees in West Pakistan, the word ‘Mohajir’, initially in limited usage, attained wide currency after the separation of East Pakistan’ etc. And my understanding, to complete the picture in the present context, is that had the Urdu-speaking Muslims from Bihar, the Biharis, migrated to West Pakistan, they would have been part of the Mohajir community as Mohajirs.

As the subject is central to our politics, it is appropriate and relevant, I start with what I wrote in my book ‘May 12, 2007: Musharraf – An MQM Guerilla in Islamabad?’ (July 2007). I wrote: ‘Some more questions need to be raised and answered. Why MQM was able to get support from the Urdu-speaking community? Why such a tendency got rooted in them? Why no other community - Punjabis, Pathans or Sindhis for example - remained safe from such negative tendencies resulting into their own brands of ‘MQMs’ in the political field? . . . Urdu-speaking community was the ‘vanguard’ and the ideologue of the Pakistan movement and consequently the most-benefited when spoils of partition – property and opportunities - were grabbed in 1947. This created a state of mind and hence the culture where everyone wanted more, or rather wanted to grab more, and believed passionately that he could get it. But there is a limit to everything in life. Therefore, the bitterness of those who were left behind in this grab business became the seed and the constituency of the MQM. That is the reason; there was never a civilizing streak in the politics of MQM. As far as other communities were concerned, they could not have the same promptness and ‘zeal’ for grab due to their backgrounds. They could only follow their seniors – the Urdu-speaking – slowly. And this they did eventually.’

And I go back to 2002 when I wrote in my document ‘Our Moment of Truth’: ‘What the world knows is that we got independence in 1947. What a tragedy to say, after half a century, that it was true only for India. There was another ambush ready for us. Those who came from Delhi and Lucknow areas were in the forefront. They had their heads full with wrong ideas and attitudes. So, as if with a sleight of hand and Islam as a cover, we were pushed towards a situation that we were entrapped and enslaved in what they called ‘Ideology’. And wrong ideas do not take you to right destinations. As a people we have been deprived of almost all essential attributes of a healthy society; as individuals we have been made sinful. Abnormality all around, almost every one of us is torn between the call of conscience and the practical compulsions of life. While the state sponsored activities led our youth to kill or even brutally murder innocent civilians in the

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name of Islam; the country in the meantime has been turned into a beggar nation. We have crisis of both *Deen* as well as *Duniya*.’

I further go back as it is basically more appropriate and more relevant. I wrote in my book ‘The Pakistan Problem’ Lahore 1993: ‘Unfortunately Pakistan’s polity has been infiltrated by prejudices and attitudes, which may safely be termed as made in Hindustan. Religion, politics and thus Pakistan became hostage to the prejudices and attitudes, which were brought in by the Hindustanis. ... One can imagine the burden they were carrying. Internally, so few to lead the backward rural Punjabis, Sindhis, and others who were ‘Do Number’ Musalmans’ because they were carrying the traces of Hinduism – the religion from which they had converted to Islam. ... The case was comparable to a Punjabi villager who having lost his handkerchief in the rush of a *mela* (village fair) thought as if the *mela* was arranged solely to steal his handkerchief. ... Looking back today at the authors and their ideas which were marketed in Pakistan, it would be a fair statement to say that the most pragmatists and realists of them proved only to be veiled extremists having the wildest and impossible dreams. Such a lot, in charge of administration and opinion making manipulated, naturally, the peoples of Pakistan who were themselves backward due to historical reasons. It became possible to create a captive public opinion on misplaced or intentionally created and entirely wrong issues. The culture, which emerged, made every new entrant an ardent and confident fortune-seeker at the cost of the country and the people. Those who failed to qualify as such became bewildered and have not yet been able to understand as to what really has happened. In such a scenario the people simply could not have a place. It is pointless to indulge in accusing this or that individual. Collectively, the culture promoted what is worst in man. ...’

Now it is the beginning of 2012. History has cleared much of the mist. There is our manifesto ‘Al-Manshoor’ since January 2009. The construction of our party is underway. And I understand that it is not possible to build Pakistan or the region – Pakistan and Afghanistan - without a right behaviour of the peoples of the region but primarily of the peoples of Pakistan because Afghanistan will have to follow the right example next door. What that right behaviour is and how so diverse peoples can be made to behave ‘rightly’? The answer lies in the domain of right politics. And right politics is not possible without understanding history rightly. Therefore you have to be right at every step. What follows is a facet of our history. It relates to those of our people who have chosen to call themselves ‘Mohajirs’. To be right here, we must not get prejudiced against this community, but try to understand what and how really things happened which brought us to the ‘minefield’ we are presently in. In this regard Brigadier (Retd) A. R. Siddiqi is helpful. In his above-mentioned book ‘Partition and the Making of the Mohajir Mindset’ he analyses Mohajir Mind vis-à-vis their own adversities. But if the idea is which seems so that Mohajirs have been victims (‘Post-Jinnah Pakistan should serve as an eye opener!’ p. xxiv, for example), it is like rubbing salt on the wounds

of others inflicted by Mohajirs directly or indirectly. The fact is that they have been primarily responsible for creating or leading others in the creation of most of the problems we are facing today. As we have to change the course of history on which we all were hurled and pushed by them using religion under the 'parental' care of the British, therefore, we have to go very far and deep to know and understand the consequences of the defects of the Mohajir mind for others and ultimately for themselves. In fact their state of mind created problems not only of South Asian but of Muslim world and even of world proportions. Massacres of 1947 in Punjab and other areas, massacres of 1971 in East Pakistan, destruction of Afghanistan, un-stoppable killings in Karachi spread over decades, Indo-Pakistan wars, sufferings of Kashmiris for over half of a century and then of Biharis for over quarter of a century can all be traced back to their doorsteps - to what now we call 'Mohajir Mind'. And then strengthening West at the cost of South Asia and the Muslim world seems like an international medal in traitorousness won by the owners of this mind!

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On November 29, 1947 the partition plan of Palestine and the creation of Israel were approved by the United Nations Resolution 181 by 33 to 13, with 10 abstentions. The 33 that cast the "Yes" vote were all Christian countries. The 13 countries that voted "No" were: Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen. All Muslim countries voted against it.

I draw the attention of the reader especially to the fact that India voted against the creation of Israel. And then India waited for more than 40 years to have diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 after the Madrid Conference (October 1991). Had Pakistan's leadership been enlightened and independent and caring about the Muslim world instead of British manufactured and having 'Mohajir' software in its head, this fact would have been widely known to the peoples of Pakistan. And there would have been a sense of gratitude among them towards India. In the larger context, whatsoever the circumstances, it would have been perhaps the best investment by the Muslims of India not to have disowned India. This would have been perhaps the best service the Muslim India could have done for the Muslim world. Had Muslim India – the 'Mohajir Mind' - not betrayed India, I feel very deeply, India would not have felt the need of a warm Western and therefore of Israeli embrace.

Therefore it is not right for Mohajirs to talk about their victim-hood before accepting their sinfulness against others sincerely and collectively, more and deeper than, as they demonstrated their faithfulness to the British before the formation of the Muslim League in 1906. And, here, my right behaviour will be to

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accept Mr. Siddiqi's observations to the extent and where there is objectivity. That will further enlighten our viewpoint helping ultimately the cause of a right politics in Pakistan.

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In the foreword to this book Dr. Manzoor Ahmad writes:

The book, is an insightful social analysis of the Mohajir mind, ... but never apologetic or repentant. ... Though critical of the romanticism of the pre-Partition Indian Muslims, especially those living in UP, he is never defensive of their behaviour or of the vision of their leaders. .... The Mohajirs could neither meld nor merge. They conflicted with all the communities, one after another, and gradually lost their competitive edge for providing high quality human resources for business management and governance. Wittingly or unwittingly they became prey to power politics and whatever efficacy they possessed in determining the course of events became proportionate to their nuisance value rather than anything else. They are now feared rather than loved. p. ix, xi

And Mr. Siddiqi wrote:

1. Now what is a Mohajir mindset? Has it been a constant, endemic condition or is it a post-Partition phenomenon? ... They were recognized and valued as true inheritors of the Mughal culture, of which the Urdu language was the finest flower, not for their ethnic lineaments. p. xiii

2. Although Urdu is rooted in Indian soil, it was ranked well below the two recognized prime languages of the subcontinent – Persian which was admired for its great literature, and Arabic, venerated for being the language of the divine text revealed in the Holy Quran. ... This admiration for Persian, rated as epitome of literary excellence and elitism, reflected the Urdu-speakers love for the exotic and cultivated indifference, even distaste, for his native Urdu. Urdu poetry tellingly portrays the deep sense of alienation that the people of Ganga-Yamuna belt felt towards their native habitat, describing their *watan* and its environs as *pardes*. An excerpt from Hali's epic *Mussadas* poignantly illustrates this feeling: *Wuh deen ju bari shan se nikla tha watan se -- Pardes main wuh aaj gharibul-ghuraba hai*: The religion which once emerged from its *watan* (native land) with such pomp and circumstance -- Most distant of the strangers. p.

xiv

3. Compared to the Hejaz, the birth place of Islam, India was seen as a foreign land in Hali's politicopoetic vision of the country. In the words of Ayesha Jalal, '*Hali's Shikwa-i-Hind* had come to haunt Indian Muslims with a vengeance'. Hali's idiom and symbolism became the currency of literary expression. Even

Allama Iqbal, the European orientation of his philosophy and thought notwithstanding, would invoke the Hejaz and *Qafila-e-Hejaz* in his patriotic verse which was fired more by his love for Islam than by love for his native land. His epic poetic works *Zarb-e-kaleem* and *Baal-e-Jibreel* pulsate with his love and his vibrant vision of a dynamic, living Islam. Xiv Preface. *Kia nahin koi Ghaznavi kargahi hayat main -- Baithe hain kab se muntazar ahle-harm ke Somnath:* Is there no Ghaznavi [Mahmood of Ghazna, AD 998-1030] in life's battlefield? -- For how long will the idols of Somnath [the historic Hindu temple ransacked by Ghaznavi] wait for the idol-breakers? His poetic hymn to the grandeur of *Haram-e-Qurtaba* (Cordoba) underscores the source of his poetic inspiration outside his own native India and powerful longing to return to ancient glory. p. xiv, xv

4. Significantly, hardly any other language or dialect of Muslim India thematically reflects nostalgia as strongly as Urdu. The state of 'refugeehood', of 'mohajirism' and alienation remains the one dominant theme of Urdu language and literature, especially its poetry. xv .... Hali's *Mussadas* and Iqbal's glorification of Samarqand and Bokhara, it portrays a transnational, trans-territorial state of mind focused on things and people of another land and stock. .... Iqbal glorified the '*Mard-i-Kohistani*' (man of the mountains) and '*Banda-e-Sehrani*' (denizen of the desert) as closest to nature and the guardians of its goal. ... He would rarely invoke the memory or the image of the sultans and the Mughals as part of ancient glory. Even his religious-mystical lexicon would rarely recall such hallowed names as Nizammudin Aulia of Delhi or Khawaja Moinuddin Chishti of Ajmer, the great sufi saints of Muslim India. Urdu would seem to be afflicted with an inborn distaste for the native land and people and an irrepressible, infantile wish to reach for the moon. All other images and icons it would superciliously leave to the lesser vehicles of expression, the local dialects and vernaculars. Iqbal hardly ever mentions Shah Abdul Latif Bhitai, Khushhal Khan Khattak of the Frontier or Sultan Bahu or Bulleh Shah of his native Punjab. Instead, he leaves them to the local vernaculars. Even the great Punjabi poet Waris Shah was left unsung because Iqbal's chaste Urdu had little space for the locals and the provincials. P. xvi

5. Urdu's fascination with the exotic and the foreign or *wilayati* imagery and idiom encouraged the bulk of Urdu-speaking Muslim India to dream of distant lands outside their own earthly abode. P. xvi

6. Paradigmatically, the Mohajir psyche may be said to have four facets: idealization, ideology, ideologization, iconoclasm – conceptualize, formulate, worship, and demolish. P. 138

7. The Mohajirs of urban Sindh – mainly of Karachi and Hyderabad – may well be likened to the Jill of the nursery rhyme. Jill (Mohajirs in Pakistan) comes

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tumbling after Jack (The Biharis of East Pakistan) has fallen down and broken his crown. The Biharis have already 'broken their crown' and stay headless in a state of suspended animation. They are disowned by Pakistan as its erstwhile citizens and denounced by Bangladesh as erstwhile Pakistani collaborators. They rot in Bangladeshi reservations: they can neither return to Pakistan as Pakistanis nor stay in Bangladesh as Bangladeshis. They have neither a valid, recognized refugee status nor citizenship. One wonders if they could be recognized as stateless people and given asylum in any number of 'fraternal' Muslim states, as was given to the Palestinians. P. 139

Jack and Jill went up the hill to fetch a pail of water  
 Jack fell down and broke his crown  
 And Jill came tumbling after.  
 (French Revolution 1793, Rhyme was written in 1795)

8. The plight of Biharis, of a people disowned by their mother country and denationalized by the country of their domicile, remains agonizingly unique in the annals of human refugeehood. There are some half a million Biharis living in the squalor of Bangladeshi reservations. P. 139

9. That was all about 'Jack', the Biharis, 'falling down and breaking their crown'. 'Jill', the Mohajir community of Pakistan, would soon 'come tumbling after'. P. 139

10. Altaf Hussain now lives in London as a British citizen. The day he got his British passport, he had himself proudly photographed with passport in hand. P. 140

11. The emergence of the MQM in 1986 and its rise as a united, close-knit, and well-led party, fired the spirit to stand up and fight for Mohajir rights as a separate entity, embodied all the Mohajir frustration, anger, and despair that had built up over the years. P. 141

12. After so many years in and out of power, it is now time for the MQM high command to make a balance sheet of the gains and losses they have brought to the Mohajir community as a whole. It is also time for them to evaluate critically how the party's aggressive political activism has impacted the Mohajir youth. P. 141

13. Today the MQM is more feared than loved, regarded as a stark reality rather than a true friend of the Mohajirs. Its partnership in the provincial and the central governments and the reversal of its anti-army stance since the ham-handed Operation Clean-up in 1992 are happy developments. Nevertheless, deep-seated distrust of the MQM's exclusivity outside the national mainstream and its one-time demand for a Mohajir province continue to impact adversely on the party's image. P. 142

14. A logical progression in the MQM's bumpy ride from 'Mohajir' to 'Muttahida' should have included the formal renunciation of its demand for a Mohajir province and the shedding of all the associated, distinctive Mohajir baggage, real or symbolic, like language, dress, culture etc. In other words to merge into the national mainstream like a drop in the ocean: *Ishrat e qatra hai darya main fana ho jana*: The ecstatic fulfillment of the drop -- Is to become one with the river and be no more – Ghalib p. 143

15. Would it be right to assume that the term Mohajir, although in common usage, is increasingly becoming associated with drop-outs and non-achievers rather than with those who are successful? What in real terms does the MQM have to show for nearly two decades of political activism? – Can it really boast of raising a new and dynamic generation of Mohajir youth fit to meet the challenges of a highly competitive world as skilled professionals and educated individuals? p. 143

16. The very word Mohajir is today little more than an anachronism, even a swearword in political polemic. For the Mohajir's state of refugeehood has degenerated into a 'state of being a rogue'. Isn't that agonizingly true of the Biharis in Bangladesh? How much longer the Biharis choose or are forced to stay in that state of being a 'rogue' is anybody's guess. Even as a political gambit, the term Mohajir has lost significance and relevance. p. 144

17. Outside their provincial milieu and habitat they drift inexorably into the state of being a 'rogue', neither owning anyone nor owned by others. p 144

18. The myth of the Mohajir is already overworked, overdrawn, and overplayed and has become tiresome. If it is not abandoned firmly and finally, the Mohajirs will be leaping out the frying pan into the fire – from a 'state of refugeehood' into the I'd call a 'state of roguehood'. 'Muttahida' remains a Mohajir outfit in substance and essence; a mere change of name is immaterial unless it is backed by substantive action, which means there must be the resolve to appear and act like others, as citizens of the same state. P. 144

19. Around the second week of September, our area of old Delhi was like a besieged fortress, with tongues of fire leaping all around. It would not be long before the blaze exploded and reduced everything to ashes. We were all anxiously waiting for Mahatma Gandhi, still in Calcutta, to come to Delhi and save whatever was left of the predominantly Muslim areas around Chandni Chowk and the Jam'a Masjid. P. 26

20. The Urdu-speaking Mohajirs from the Ganga-Yamuna belt show a strong preference, or a tragic weakness, for a strong man, and a dedication to an

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essentially romantic idea rather than to an achievable, practical goal hence absolute commitment to the idea of Pakistan and their active participation in the struggle for its creation under the leadership of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The MQM draws its inspiration from the same Mohajir mindset of absolute loyalty and devotion to one man, in this case Altaf Hussain who, even as an exile in London, controls and wields the party apparatus anyway he chooses, practically unopposed and undisputed. As a popular party slogan would have it, *Jou Qaid ka ghaddar hai, wuh maat ka haqdar hai*. Anyone playing a traitor to the leader deserves to die. P. xxviii

21. The leader and not the goal is what appeals more to the Mohajir mindset, as reflected in another MQM slogan: *Hamain manzil nahin rehnuma chahiye*. P. xxviii

22. The question is: What happens to the followers when the leader is no more? What happens to the MQM after a change at the top? It will return immediately to its Mohajir roots and cease to be Muttahida' except in name, with little or no place in an ethnically-driven Pakistan. P. xxviii Post-Jinnah Pakistan should serve as an eye opener! P. xxix

Although the following two excerpts do not belong to the subject matter directly, but they do show the cultural influence of the Urdu-speaking Indian Muslims on the Punjabi mind which proved fatal not only for Punjab but for the entire region. Not only Punjabi mind, their influence was all over Indian Muslims.

23. When asked why he chose Urdu as his preferred medium of literary expression as opposed to Punjabi, Faiz Ahmad Faiz, Pakistan's best-known and admired Urdu poet after Mohammad Iqbal, said, 'Look, I adopted Urdu hoping one day my compositions might be nearly as good as those of Ghalib's without, of course, ever being as good. But never even near that of (the Punjabi poet) Waris Shah even if I had a second span of life. ....' p. 149

24. The poet-philosopher of Pakistan and the sub-continent's greatest Urdu-Persian poet of the twentieth century, Mohammad Iqbal, hardly ever spoke Urdu at home. Shortly before his death, he asked one of friends to recite from the Punjabi sufi poet Bulleh Shah. One of the Iqbal's insightful biographers Iqbal Singh, gives the following graphic account of the request the poet made to Diwan Ali. 'Iqbal requested Diwan Ali to recite some Punjabi verse to make his last journey joyful. Diwan Ali rendered soulfully some verses of the Punjabi Sufi poet Bulleh Shah. The verses moved Iqbal deeply and tears streamed down his cheeks. ...' p. 149)



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How Pakistan will be able to come out of this disorientation which is history-based will really be amazing and a miracle. ■